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INTRODUCTION

From the American Revolution to women’s suffrage to the civil rights era,
popular grassroots campaigns have shaped the United States.1 Social justice
movements have continuously had an integral role in the American political
scheme for centuries, and continue to advocate for change via various forms
of protest and resistance.2 One well-known method is the boycott, which is
the refusal to purchase certain goods or participate in certain activities to
bring about social, political, and economic change.3
Currently, a boycott initiative that has gained international coverage is the
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.4 Since its creation in
2005, BDS has modeled itself after the South African anti-apartheid boycott
campaign through nonviolent boycott methods.5 By utilizing such methods,
it seeks to pressure the Israeli government to end its occupation of Palestinian
territories and to respect the human rights of the Palestinian people.6 BDS
asks its supporters to boycott Israel academically, culturally, and
economically via activism at various levels of society.7 BDS has had an
1. See generally Nick Carbone, Top 10 American Protest Movements, TIME (Oct.
12, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2096654_
2096653_2096692,00.html (listing ten sociopolitical protests from American history,
beginning with the Boston Tea Party as the “original American protest” in 1773).
2. See id. (mentioning multiple forms of expressing dissent: marches, rallies, and
groups dedicated to certain causes).
3. See EMILY BEAULIEU, ELECTORAL PROTEST AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD, 140 (2014) (discussing famous historical boycotts like the civil
rights era boycott of public transportation and the refusal of sixty-one countries to join
the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow).
4. See What is BDS?, BDS, https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds (last visited Oct.
14, 2016) (noting that BDS is a vibrant and growing global movement).
5. See id. (stating that BDS is peacefully pressuring Israel to end the occupation,
giving equal rights to Palestinian citizens of Israel, and giving the right of return to
Palestinian refugees).
6. See id. (listing the BDS campaign’s main goals).
7. See Campaign Areas, BDS, https://bdsmovement.net/campaigns (last visited
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impact on foreign investment in Israel.8
Although BDS focuses on the Palestinian cause, its inclusion is not limited
to solely Palestinian participants.9 A variety of public figures and institutions
from around the world and from various cultures have spoken out in support
of BDS.10 In response, critics of BDS have called it discriminatory.11
As of November 2016, a handful of states have enacted anti-BDS
legislation, while in other states such measures are pending or have been
defeated.12 In New York on June 5, 2016, Governor Cuomo surprised his
constituents when he signed State of New York Executive Order Number
157 (EO No. 157).13 EO No. 157 not only orders state agencies and
authorities to divest government funds from institutions and companies that
support BDS, but requires the New York Office of General Services to
publish an online blacklist of these entities.14 Governor Cuomo signed EO
No. 157 after the New York legislature failed for months to pass proposed
anti-BDS legislation.15 Commentators argue that EO No. 157, and similar
measures in other states, violate the constitutional right to free speech.16 This
Oct. 14, 2016) (showing its activism at the government, student, and trade union levels).
8. See What is BDS?, supra note 4 (citing a forty-six percent drop in foreign
investment in Israel in 2014).
9. See What is BDS?, supra note 4 (declaring BDS’s opposition to all racism and
discrimination, including anti-Semitism and Islamophobia).
10. See id. (including Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Angela Y. Davis, the Presbyterian
Church, and Stephen Hawking).
11. See Ben Norton, The New McCarthyism Is Pro-Israel: Legal Groups Slam NY
Gov. Andrew Cuomo for Creating “Unconstitutional” Blacklist of BDS Supporters,
SALON (June 6, 2016, 5:45 PM), http://www.salon.com/2016/06/06/the_new_
mccarthyism_is_pro_israel_legal_groups_slam_ny_gov_andrew_cuomo_for_creating_
unconstitutional_blacklist_of_bds_supporters (calling the protests an “anti-Israel
campaign”).
12. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-85 (West 2016) (prohibiting state contracts for
companies engaging in the boycott of Israel); H.B. 476, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2016) (banning contracts between state agencies and businesses that participate in
the BDS movement); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-5300 (2015) (ordering public entities to
not contract with businesses that boycott areas with which South Carolina can trade
freely).
13. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016) (explaining that New
York and Israel have a special bond).
14. Id.
15. See Norton, supra note 11 (punishing businesses that engage in the boycott to
fight for Palestinian rights with EO No. 157).
16. See id. (citing organizations like Palestine Legal and the New York Civil
Liberties Union, which stated that blacklists based on political views raise serious First
Amendment concerns).
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comment will not address First Amendment concerns of anti-BDS state
measures.17
This comment argues that EO No. 157, and similar state measures, are
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution because
such measures are preempted by the federal government’s constitutional
powers over the issue. To develop this argument, Part II discusses the
Supremacy Clause and the related concepts of express and implied
preemption.18 Part III shows that EO No. 157 is unconstitutional under three
types of implied preemption: field, foreign affairs, and federal objectives.19
Part IV recommends that lawmakers revoke such measures.20 Part V
concludes by summarizing the reasons why EO No. 157 is unconstitutional
and must be revoked.21
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Anatomy of Executive Order No. 157 and its Legislative Precedent
EO No. 157 utilizes broad language to express unequivocal allegiance to
the state of Israel.22 Governor Cuomo’s Order declares that New York does
not support BDS and will not allow its funds to further the campaign.23 The
Order applies to any agencies and departments under the Governor’s
authority as well as various other entities for which he chooses the
overseeing chairs.24 In addition to its broad condemnation of BDS as a
17. See generally Recent Legislation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2031 (2016)
(arguing, by looking at Supreme Court precedent, that anti-BDS laws violate the First
Amendment).
18. See infra Part II (providing background information on the various legal aspects
on which this comment relies in Part III).
19. See infra Part III (utilizing the legal concepts discussed in part II to prove that
EO No. 157 is preempted by pervasive federal interest in the field of foreign affairs and
because the boycotts conflict with federal objectives).
20. See infra Part IV (explaining that, as a matter of policy, EO No. 157, and bills
like it, should be repealed and left to the federal government to determine).
21. See infra Part V (reiterating the main points of this comment).
22. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016) (declaring that New
York stands firmly beside Israel, an irreplaceable and historical ally).
23. See id. (elaborating that the state’s investments will not support any BDS efforts,
whether indirectly or directly, and defining the prohibited conduct as any activity
intending to pressure the government of Israel to alter its policies).
24. See id. (including “all public-benefit corporations, public authorities, boards, and
commissions, for which the Governor appoints the Chair, the Chief Executive, or the
majority of Board Members, except for the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey”).
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whole, EO No. 157 requires that the Commissioner of the Office of General
Services (Commissioner) create a list of organizations and businesses that
publicly engage in BDS activity.25 The Commissioner must then post the list
on the website of the New York Office of General Services.26 All affected
state entities must divest from any entity listed.27 The blacklist dated May
31, 2017, lists fourteen international companies and institutions.28
This measure is not unprecedented; the federal government has passed
three primary and relevant measures that delve into BDS and boycotts of
other countries.29 Most recently, President Obama signed the Trade
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) into law.30 The
TFTEA affirms the American-Israeli relationship, restates the American
policy to combat the Arab League boycott of Israel, and opposes political
initiatives that restrict commercial relations with Israel.31 The TFTEA
targets boycotts, divestment, and sanctions of Israeli products, and opposes
such actions.32 It also requires that the President submit an annual report to

25. See id. (providing no exceptions to companies and institutions that were eligible
to be placed on the list).
26. See id. (commanding the Commissioner to provide written notice of intent to list
entities that he suspects support BDS, and allowing them to prove that they do not
support BDS, directly or indirectly, to avoid placement on the list).
27. See id. (forbidding future investments in institutions or companies on the
blacklist).
28. See Institutions or Companies Determined to Participate In Boycott, Divestment,
or Sanctions Activity Targeting Israel, OFFICE OF GENERAL SERVICES (May 31, 2017),
https://www.ogs.state.ny.us/eo/157/Docs/EO157_Institutions_Companies_List.pdf
(listing international companies such as Danske Bank and KLP Kapitalforvaltning);
Conor Skelding, Cuomo quietly releases Israel-boycott opposition list, perplexing
targeted companies, POLITICO (Dec. 9, 2016, 5:42 AM) (reporting that the first release
of the blacklist consisted of thirteen international companies).
29. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 § 909, 19 U.S.C.A. §
4452 (2016) (alluding repetitively that boycott, divestment, and sanctions of Israel will
not be tolerated in international trade); Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 4601–4623 (West 1979) (establishing the federal government’s power to
control restrictive trade practices with other countries); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (denying tax
benefits to U.S. businesses that participate in boycotting countries).
30. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 § 4452 (noting that
the statute went into effect February 24, 2016).
31. See id. § 4452(a)-(f) (stating that over forty-five billion dollars worth of goods
and services is traded between the United States and Israel annually).
32. See id. § 4452(b)(4)-(7), (c)(1) (stating that BDS violates the nondiscrimination
principle of GATT 1994 and a primary goal of U.S. commercial partnerships will be to
discourage BDS).
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Congress about “politically motivated boycotts of, divestment from, and
sanctions against Israel.”33 After President Obama signed the TFTEA, the
White House released a statement that the President opposed the provision
addressing Israel as it contradicted his policy on Israeli settlements.34
The two other laws that address boycotts of Israel are the Export
Administration Act (EAA) and the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 (Ribicoff Amendment).35 The EAA requires Americans to
report to the Department of Commerce requests they receive to support in
any way a prohibited boycott.36 The Ribicoff Amendment requires people
to report their participation in boycotts of other countries to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).37 Both of these laws target secondary and tertiary
boycotts.38
B. The Supremacy Clause and the Interpretation of Field Preemption
The Supremacy Clause defines the relationship between the federal and
state governments by making the Constitution and federal laws the supreme
laws of the country.39 The Supremacy Clause establishes the concept of
preemption where federal laws nullify state laws if they conflict with federal
legislation or one of Congress’ constitutionally enumerated powers.40
Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws must yield to constitutionally

33. See id. § 4452(d) (requiring the President to submit the report every year starting
by February 24, 2016 and then every year after on such activities).
34. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Statement by the
Press Secretary on the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (Feb. 11,
2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/11/statementpress-secretary-trade-facilitation-and-trade-enforcement-act
(acknowledging
concessions made in the interest of passing the bipartisan legislation).
35. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452(a)(6)(B)-(C)(noting that the policy of the U.S. has been
to oppose boycotts of Israel, citing the EAA and the Ribicoff Amendment).
36. See MELISSA REDMILES, INTERNATIONAL BOYCOTT REPORTS, 2003 AND 2004
(2004), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03-04boycott.pdf (disclosing that those who do
engage in such activity are subject to criminal or civil penalties).
37. See id. (including all business transactions, even if they do not produce revenue).
38. See id. (explaining that these laws only apply when a country requires a US
business partner to boycott a country or forbids an American person from doing business
with others that deal with the boycotted state).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; People v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 209 Cal.
App. 4th 1513, 1521 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (arguing that the preemption doctrine gives
force to the Supremacy Clause).
40. See Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 209 Cal. App. 4th at 1521-22 (explaining the
three types of preemption recognized by the Supreme Court).
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valid federal legislation.41 The Supreme Court has described several
different categories of preemption.42 The two main categories of preemption
are express and implied.43 The Supreme Court’s pattern of analysis for
preemption is quite flexible and without rigid requirements.44 The federal
government’s intent is the core of every preemption analysis.45
Express preemption is the most direct way to prove that Congress
regulates a subject because it exists when the federal government expressly
states its dominance in a federal law.46 For example, in Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly the Supreme Court held that a federal law preempted state
regulations because Congress expressly declared that states or localities
could not impose extra requirements.47
In contrast, courts find implied preemption in several circumstances where
a regulatory text does not explicitly state its intent to preempt.48 One is
federal objectives preemption, where a state law obstructs congressional
goals.49 Another is field preemption, where it is reasonable to assume that
the national government controls an issue.50 A third circumstance is conflict
preemption, which this comment will not address.51
41. NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 155 (2005) (saying that states may not impede the federal
government and that federal laws supersede state laws).
42. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 288 (7th ed. 2013)
(explaining that express preemption exists when a statute refers to the laws which it
precludes, and conflict preemption exists where federal and state laws cannot exist
simultaneously).
43. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)
(elaborating that preemption is compelled regardless of whether Congress explicitly
states so or implicitly indicates).
44. See id. (stating that the goal of the Court is to decide if the “regulation is
consistent with the structure and purpose of the [federal] statute”).
45. See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 471 (1996) (stating that preemption
cases rely on “a fair understanding of congressional purpose”) (quoting Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530, n. 27 (1992)).
46. See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551-52 (2001)
(holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expressly preempted
the Massachusetts Attorney General’s advertising regulations).
47. See id. (adding that the preemption applies to state regulations regarding
advertising or promotion).
48. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 413-14 (4th ed. 2016) (discussing
how the courts found implied preemption).
49. See id. (defining federal objectives preemption).
50. See id. (sharing that although these categories are presented distinctly, they often
overlap and are not mutually exclusive).
51. See id. at 431 (informing that conflict preemption arises when someone cannot
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Federal objectives preemption arises when a state law interferes with a
federal goal or is an obstacle to the full purposes of Congress.52 This type of
preemption arises in various instances, such as when a state law undermines
federal uniform standards.53 The Supreme Court has used drastically
different standards in deciding whether to apply a broad or narrow
characterization of the federal goal.54
On the other hand, field preemption arises when the federal government’s
interests are so dominant that it totally occupies the scope of a certain field.55
Congress’ interest to dominate a field can be demonstrated by showing the
existence of pervasive federal regulatory schemes.56
Regardless of whether a state law complies with federal law, Congress
may still override state action due to its intent to control a certain field in
which it constitutionally has a valid power to regulate.57 Even budding
federal dominance of a field may suffice to preempt state laws.58 If multiple
pieces of federal laws rule on a specific subject, a court will hold that
Congress intended to dominate that certain field.59
C. The Intersection of Federal Preemption and the Power to Regulate
Foreign Affairs
The federal government dominates a variety of fields.60 One such field is
comply with both a federal law and a state law).
52. See id. at 435, 439 (distinguishing federal objective preemption by way of
example (citing Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm’n, 386 U.S. 990 (1967))).
53. See id. at 435 (citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971)).
54. Compare Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98-102 (1992)
(applying federal objectives preemption to many state laws), with Pac. Gas & Elec. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983) (rejecting
the presumption of preemption by applying a narrow federal purpose).
55. See STONE, supra note 42, at 288 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that federal regulation is so pervasive that it is reasonable
to assume that Congress left no room for states to supplement it)).
56. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (finding that the
federal government intended to completely occupy the field of alien registration through
its system).
57. See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015) (specifying that
through field preemption, Congress intended to control the area even if a law complies
with federal standards).
58. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497 (1988)
(clarifying that federal legislation may preempt state action before its effective date).
59. See id. at 498 (explaining the standard for determining congressional intent to
preempt a field).
60. See North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 309 (1983) (recognizing that
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the field of foreign affairs.61 The Constitution contains enumerated
provisions that specifically allocate the exclusive power to regulate foreign
affairs to the President and Congress.62 The Supreme Court has held that the
federal government inherits all powers over external relations as a direct
result of the United States’ status as a sovereign nation.63 Consequently, the
federal government possesses all powers necessary to maintain a substantial
control over international affairs.64
As a result, courts typically hold that state laws are preempted when they
encroach on the federal government’s power to regulate foreign affairs.65
This is defined as foreign affairs preemption.66 In Hines v. Davidowitz, for
example, the Supreme Court held that the federal government controlled the
field of alien registration because it touched upon international relations, and
thus preempted a state’s immigration regulation.67 Hines established two
noteworthy rules: first, that preemption exists where a state law complements
federal law, and second, preemption can exist in the absence of express
preemptive language in the federal measure.68
protecting birds is a national interest); see also Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau
of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 839 (1982) (ruling tribal affairs are federally regulated).
61. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941) (informing that the federal
government’s power regarding foreign affairs has always required wide-reaching
authority).
62. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (delegating to the President the authority to make
treaties, which the Senate is authorized to advise and consent, and naming the President
as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
(authorizing Congress to raise and support armies and declare war).
63. See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936) (stating that the federal government’s sovereignty powers did not need to be
constitutionally granted).
64. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (embellishing that in
respect to foreign relations, states cannot differentiate from the rest of the country).
65. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (holding that an Oregon
statute regarding alien property rights intruded on the foreign powers doctrine); Von
Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 2010)
(subjecting a California statute to a field preemption analysis because it created a global
venue for the resolution of Holocaust restitution claims).
66. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir.
2012) (informing that foreign affairs preemption encompasses the doctrines of field and
conflict preemption).
67. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64-65 (majority opinion), 72-74 (Stone,
J., dissenting) (1941) (holding that federal law broadly preempted a Pennsylvania law
regulating alien registration policies, even though it complemented federal regulations).
68. See id.; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 424 (stating that field preemption means
federal law preempts even complementary state laws).
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State laws must yield to federal laws regarding foreign affairs because the
latter’s interests are so dominant that the federal system must control.69
Arizona v. United States further developed the intersection of field
preemption and the foreign affairs doctrine when the Supreme Court found
that federal law preempted provisions of an Arizona immigration law.70 The
Court analyzed the federal government’s regulatory and legislative history
over alien registration requirements to demonstrate Congress’ intent to
occupy the field of foreign relations matters.71 A key element was the
existence of one national sovereign serving as the main communicative body
with other nations.72 Thus, there was no room for state laws to curtail or
complement federal policy.73
Furthermore, field preemption applies when state measures touch on
foreign affairs policies.74 In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, the
Court overruled a Massachusetts law that restricted state agencies from
buying goods or services from entities that conducted business with Burma
(Myanmar)—the Massachusetts Law.75 First, the Court found that the state
measure conflicted with the President’s authority to regulate economic
sanctions.76 Second, it interfered with the manner in which Congress had
chosen to exercise economic pressure on Burma.77 The Massachusetts Law
had a wider-reaching scope of punishment than the federal scheme, and
affected foreign and domestic companies while the federal law affected only
69. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501-02 (2012) (arguing that field
preemption must demonstrate the federal intent to preempt state regulation in an area).
70. See id. at 2510 (striking invalid certain provisions of the Arizona immigration
law).
71. See id. at 2501 (establishing that congressional intent to displace state law can
be inferred from either analyzing the framework of the regulation or by determining if
the federal interest is dominant).
72. See id. at 2498 (explaining that the ability of foreign nations to communicate
with one national sovereign is fundamental, and that immigration policy can affect
“trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations”).
73. See id. at 2501–02 (reasoning that an Arizona immigration law inflicted
additional punishment for undocumented immigrants and clashed with the federal
scheme).
74. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (ruling
that, under the Supremacy Clause the Massachusetts boycott of Burma presented a threat
to national legislative objectives).
75. See id. at 366–68 (communicating that the Massachusetts Law had a broad scope
with only three exceptions to the forbidden entities).
76. See id. at 363–65 (explaining that Congress indicated that it wished the President
to have the authority to preempt the field by authorizing him to control the measures).
77. See id. at 364 (explaining that Congress’ plan was not so broad).

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss4/5

10

Hillou: Criminalizing Nonviolent Dissent

2017]

CRIMINALIZING NONVIOLENT DISSENT

537

American companies.78 Third, regardless of what measures Congress chose
to enact, the state measure conflicted with the President’s authority to
represent the United States.79 The President had to communicate with other
countries regarding Burma sanctions, which gave the President the highest
authority of the federal government.80 The Massachusetts Law lessened the
President’s ability to succeed.81
State laws that align with federal foreign policy laws will be preempted
because their existence compromises the President’s power to speak for the
nation.82 In Odebrecht Construction, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Transportation, for example, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed a Florida law
prohibiting companies that conducted business with Cuba from accessing
Florida’s public contracting market.83 The court analyzed Congress’
economic policies regarding Cuba and determined that the federal scheme
was so pervasive that the Cuba Amendment was unconstitutional.84 The
federal government occupied the entire field of foreign relations, and state
measures had no authority in this field.85
III. ANALYSIS
A. Courts Should Find New York’s EO No. 157 Unconstitutional Under
Implied Preemption Analyses Because It Addresses Issues That Congress
Has Implied Its Intent to Control
In light of the law discussed above, courts should scrutinize anti-BDS

78. See id. (arguing that by penalizing people for actions that Congress explicitly
allows, the Massachusetts Law conflicts with federal law).
79. See id. at 374, 377, 380, 388 (holding, ultimately, that the President has the
authority to adjust economic sanctions against another country, which preempts a state’s
involvement).
80. See id. at 364 (explaining that Congress authorized the President to facilitate
discussions between the Burmese regime and the democratic opposition).
81. See id. (expressing that the Executive consistently said that the Massachusetts
law hindered diplomacy).
82. See Odebrecht Const., Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 1285-86,
1290 (11th Cir. 2013) (striking down Florida’s Cuba Law, which conflicted with federal
laws).
83. See id. at 1285 (finding Congress preempted the Florida Law).
84. See id. at 1274-78, 1282-83 (stating that the many in-depth pieces of federal
legislation economically addressing Cuba demonstrated that the federal scheme was
intricate and pervasive).
85. See id. at 1272 (explaining that the discrepancies between federal and state law
weakened the President’s power to adjust sanctions).
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measures under the Supremacy Clause.86 In undertaking such an analysis,
one must determine which preemption lenses are most relevant to scrutinize
New York’s EO No. 157.87
1. Courts Are Not Likely to Apply Express Preemption to New York’s EO
No. 157 Because Congress Has Not Passed a Law that Explicitly Denies
States’ Power to Legislate BDS
In this case, express preemption is not applicable because no federal law
has explicitly stated that it wishes to preempt state-level anti-BDS
legislation.88 If there were a federal anti-BDS statute that explicitly stated
its intent to preempt state-level legislation regarding the issue, then an
express preemption lens would be applicable.89 As seen in Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, a federal law preempts state regulations when
Congress expresses that states or localities cannot impose additional
requirements.90 Similarly, if a congressional act existed stating that states or
localities could not impose certain policies in regards to BDS, express
preemption would be the appropriate lens to analyze New York’s EO No.
157.91
Here, the only three congressional measures that address boycotts on
Israeli products are the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of
2015 (TFTEA), Export Administration Act (EAA), and the Ribicoff
Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (Ribicoff Amendment).92

86. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 (arguing that to determine if Congress has the power
to preempt state law, courts should utilize one of the various types of preemption).
87. See id. at 372–73 (explaining different types of preemption and then determining
under which lens should EO No. 157 fall).
88. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541-42 (2001) (explaining
that when a federal statute explicitly states its scope, express preemption applies).
89. See id. at 537 (advising that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
contained a preemption clause, which banned states from enacting any provisions that
imposed regulations on smoking regarding the advertisement or promotion of cigarettes).
90. See id. at 540 (explaining that when a federal statute explicitly states its scope,
express preemption applies).
91. See generally id. at 537, 547 (arguing that the regulations directly targeting
cigarette advertising establish an indirect relationship between the regulations and
cigarette advertising).
92. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 § 909, 19 U.S.C.A. §
4452 (2016) (alluding repeatedly that boycott, divestment, and sanctions of Israel will
not be tolerated in international trade); see also Export Administration Act of 1979
(EAA), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 4601–4623 (West 1979) (establishing the federal government’s
power to control restrictive trade practices with other countries); Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
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However, none include a statement or any language demonstrating that
Congress expressly barred states from regulating this issue.93 Because there
is no such express statement within the three anti-BDS or anti-boycott laws,
the court may not find express preemption.94 That means that an implied
preemption lens should apply when analyzing EO No. 157.95 Thus, the most
obvious lenses for analysis are field preemption, foreign affairs preemption,
and federal objectives preemption.96
2. Under a Field Preemption Lens, Courts Should Rule EO No. 157
Unconstitutional Because Congress Has Indicated It Intends to Preempt
the Field
When scrutinizing anti-BDS measures such as New York’s EO No. 157,
courts should first apply a field preemption lens.97 As seen in Arizona v.
United States and Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, field
preemption arises where federal interest is so dominant that a court would
naturally assume that the federal system precludes state law.98 As discussed
below, field preemption most certainly exists here.
In Arizona, one of the main factors in determining whether Congress had
preempted the field of alien registration regulation was the fact that the field
touched upon foreign relations.99 Here, New York’s EO No. 157 certainly
(noting that past laws “contained no tax provisions dealing with international boycotts”).
93. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452 (adopting an international focus); EAA, 50 U.S.C.A. §
4604(a)(1) (focusing on the federal government’s powers); Tax Reform Act of 1976
(laying out how to determine if a business is participating in a boycott).
94. See R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 745 A.2d 1174, 1186 (N.J. 2000) (explaining that
implied preemption may arise when there is no express preemption).
95. See id. (stating that the two types of implied preemption are field and conflict
preemption).
96. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (ruling that
immigration involved foreign affairs and preempted state measures); Crosby v. Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000) (alluding that the foreign affairs
doctrine involves global economic policies); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n,
505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (applying federal objectives preemption to a large number of
state laws).
97. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (arguing that
Arizona’s law was held as valid, then other states could make similar statutes which
would ruin Congress’ powers and existing regulations); Crosby, 530 U.S. at 375 (2000)
(stating that the President must control the field of economic foreign policy).
98. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (noting that federal interest can be found by
looking at laws that Congress has enacted); Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 (highlighting how
federal interest is dominant).
99. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (demonstrating how foreign affairs falls squarely
within the purview of the federal government).
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touches upon foreign relations because it deals with policies concerning
Israel.100 In Arizona, the Supreme Court established that field preemption
will have such a wide scope that simply touching upon foreign affairs means
that a state law will be preempted.101 Whether the state law complemented
the federal laws was completely irrelevant.102 Here, even though New
York’s EO No. 157 might seem complementary to the federal law, it too
must be preempted because it touches upon the incredibly sensitive field of
foreign affairs by addressing the boycott of a foreign nation.103
The fact that the federal government has not enacted an express
preemptive provision regarding BDS does not provide permissive authority
for states to establish such measures by executive order or other measures.104
The foreign affairs and field preemption doctrines require no such express
preemption language.105 Congress’ posture merely indicates that these
robust implied preemption doctrines are so settled that courts will apply them
without explicit or detailed instructions from Congress.106 Courts will refer
to the federal government’s constitutional authority over foreign affairs
matters generally.107 By applying that rule here, it means that that the New
York governor may not interpret the lack of a specific domestic anti-BDS
federal law as agreeable silence on the issue.108
100. See id. at 2506 (finding that Arizona’s immigration statute affected U.S. relations
with foreign nations); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016) (affirming
New York’s support of Israel and rejection of BDS).
101. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510 (elaborating that immigration is such a powerful
subject that it shapes the destiny of the country).
102. See id. at 2501-02 (arguing that the complete scheme of alien registration touches
upon foreign affairs which means that complementary and curtailing state measures are
preempted).
103. See id. (explaining that the federal scheme was complete and did not allow for
states to touch upon the subject).
104. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000)
(recognizing that preemption does not rely on express provisions alone, and that
Congress’ silence on a certain issue does not mean endorsement but can be interpreted
ambiguously).
105. See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 964
(9th Cir. 2010) (subjecting a California statute to a field preemption analysis because its
law created a global venue for the resolution of Holocaust restitution claims, even though
no specifically relevant law was in place).
106. See id. at 964 (reasoning that courts consistently invalidate state laws which
attempt to regulate an area of traditional state competence, but do touch upon foreign
affairs).
107. See id. at 963–64 (reiterating that a state violates the Constitution by establishing
its own foreign policy).
108. See id. (stating that foreign affairs field preemption may arise even when there
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Additionally, the Congressional purpose for the federal government is to
occupy the field of economic policies with Israel.109 The Supreme Court
reasoned in Hines that the nature of the country’s government is to represent
the entire nation as one people, and therefore the field of foreign relations
has no room for state or local impediment.110 Through the TFTEA, Congress
and the President addressed a plethora of important trade issues, such as
intellectual property rights, anti-dumping, and the currency exchange rate.111
Congress purposefully included a provision regarding boycotts, divestment,
and sanctions to Israeli products.112 Consequently, only the President and
the executive branch have the power to regulate this area.113 Therefore, the
New York’s governor lacks authority to sign EO No. 157 because Congress
delegated the field of foreign relations to the President.114
Because tEO No. 157 touches an issue related with Israel, the Order is
inconsistent under the Supremacy Clause. As the Supreme Court clarified
in Arizona v. United States, state policies on matters even slightly related to
foreign relations easily run afoul of the Supremacy Clause because they
potentially conflict with the Executive’s foreign affairs powers.115 As noted
in Arizona, state immigration policies were invalid because they could affect
“trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation,”
as well as the treatment of American citizens abroad.116 State anti-BDS
is no treaty or federal statute in place).
109. See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (stating that “the purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touch-stone” in all preemption cases (quoting Retail Clerks
v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))).
110. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (arguing that the Constitution
makes clear that Congress controls the field of international relations in general as it
represents the interests of all American cities, counties, states, and people).
111. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 § 909, 19 U.S.C.A.
§§ 4452, 4341, 4401, 4421 (2016) (exemplifying the vast subjects that the statute
covered).
112. 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452(a)-(f) (discouraging boycotts of Israel by Bahrain, Oman,
and Saudi Arabia).
113. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 65-66 (reasoning that when regulations are so blended
with the responsibilities of the national government, and when a state attempts to act on
the same issue, the act of Congress dominates).
114. See id. at 67-68 (stating that international relations is a field largely dominated
by Congress).
115. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501-02 (2012) (reasoning that
immigration policies are interlinked with foreign affairs interests of the federal
government because when a law touches on foreign affairs, states cannot curtail,
complement, or add to federal law).
116. See id. at 2498 (adding that such a law would alter the perception of aliens in this
country who seek the protection of the law).
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measures like New York’s EO No. 157 have the potential to influence issues
of trade, investment, tourism, and foreign relations for the entire country.117
State anti-BDS measures affect such issues because they demand divestment
from any and all entities whom they identify as BDS supporters.118 AntiBDS Policies are similar to the law discussed in Arizona because both affect
national interests by advocating one side of a foreign affairs issue, regardless
of the United States’ position, while punishing citizens with the other
view.119 When the topic at hand affects the broader sphere of foreign affairs,
states cannot restrain, accompany federal law, or staple on further
regulations.120
Even if a state anti-BDS law is arguably complementary to the federal
government’s policies, such as taking a similar stance to the TFTEA
provisions, a state may not impose its own punishments in a federally
dominated field.121 In Arizona, the Court rejected the state’s argument that
one of the provisions of its controversial immigration law had the same goal
and substantive standards as federal law.122 The Supreme Court held that
field preemption does not allow the states to become involved in fields that
the federal government has occupied in any fashion.123 Similarly, EO No.
157 inflicts punishment upon American persons, and thus upsets the
sensitive framework which Congress wishes to control through the TFTEA,
EAA, and Ribicoff Amendment.124
117. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016) (declaring that New
York rejects BDS and boycott tactics that threaten allies and trade partners).
118. See id. (utilizing vague language so that the list may include any institution or
company that practices BDS).
119. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506-07 (2012) (asserting that
removal decisions touch upon federal foreign relations powers and require analysis of
political and economic circumstances); see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363, 363-64 (2000) (stating that the President has the right to adjust economic
sanctions against another country and preempts a state’s involvement).
120. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (utilizing an example of a previous ruling that
Pennsylvania could not have its own alien registration regulations because the issue itself
breached the field of foreign affairs where the federal government had its own complete
scheme regarding alien registration).
121. See id. (citing California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730–31 (1949) (stating that even
if States make violations of federal law a crime, they cannot do so in federally dominated
areas); In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372, 375–76 (1890) (ruling that states could not have their
unique punishment for perjury in federal courts)).
122. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (informing that field preemption precludes any
state regulation even if it is similar to federal standards).
123. See id. (arguing that allowing states to inflict their own punishments for federal
offenses would contradict the careful framework that Congress had enacted).
124. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016) (providing that entities
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Regarding local issues that may delve into foreign affairs, states may only
enact relevant laws if their effects are negligible upon international
relations.125 Here, EO No. 157 utilizes explicit language to define the state’s
relationship with the state of Israel.126 However, the United States
Government has been hugely involved in the Middle Eastern peace process
for years.127 Measures like EO No. 157 punish nonprofits, NGOs, awareness
groups, churches, and other international advocates of BDS, which
ultimately affects the perception of the United States as an actor within the
peace process.128 This punishment could have serious consequences for the
United States Executive branch at international tables.129 As seen in Crosby,
unilateral state actions like the Massachusetts Burma Law and New York’s
EO No. 157 complicate international coalition building to promote
democracy and human rights.130
Field preemption of foreign affairs arises even when there is no treaty or
federal statute present.131 This rule applies to the New York EO No. 157,
because there is no congressional measure addressing BDS itself, or BDS
activities domestically.132 State lines dissolve when interactions with foreign
cannot receive New York State funding); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (holding
that Arizona may not create its own immigration laws when such laws exist at the federal
level).
125. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (holding that an Oregon statute
regarding alien property rights was an unconstitutional intrusion into the foreign powers
doctrine granted to the Executive branch and Congress).
126. See tit. 9, § 8.157 (asserting that New York has a historically special relationship
with Israel).
127. See generally Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081, 2087-88 (2016)
(noting that Jerusalem is a sensitive topic, and that even within the federal government’s
powers over foreign affairs, recognition is a power of the President alone).
128. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (discussing that
mistreatment of aliens in the United States could lead to retaliatory treatment of
Americans abroad).
129. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2082 (mentioning that protests were ignited in the
Gaza Strip and elsewhere in response to Congress’ Act allowing Americans to list
Jerusalem, Israel, on passports).
130. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 383-85 (2000)
(discussing that high-level discussions between the United States and European Union
focused not on helping Burma, but on what to do about the Massachusetts law).
131. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 429 (2003) (ruling that although
no federal regulation existed, a California law involved foreign affairs powers and was
invalid).
132. See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 965
(9th Cir. 2010) (subjecting a California statute to field preemption analysis because its
law actually created a global venue for the resolution of Holocaust restitution claims,
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nations are involved.133 Similarly, although there is no anti-BDS treaty or
national statute criminalizing BDS in the domestic context, New York’s antiBDS EO No. 157 is still preempted under the foreign affairs power of the
government.134
3. Within the Scope of the Foreign Affairs Doctrine, EO No. 157 is
Preempted Because It Touches upon a Foreign Affairs Issue
New York’s EO No. 157 is illegitimate under the foreign affairs doctrine
field preemption doctrine.135 The foreign affairs doctrine triggers the federal
preemption of that entire field, and EO No. 157 should be analyzed under
the relevant precedential framework. 136 In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Supreme
Court held that state powers affecting foreign affairs are “restricted to the
narrowest of limits” because it is a field which Congress prevalently and
consistently oversees.137
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that the ability to lift and
impose economic policies is essential to the President’s exclusive foreign
affairs powers.138 In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, the
Supreme Court established that only the President had the authority to lift or
impose economic sanctions in the interest of national security.139 The
even though no specifically relevant law was in place).
133. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (embellishing that in
respect to foreign relations, “the state of New York does not exist” – it cannot be
differentiated from the rest of the country in this regard).
134. See Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 964 (holding that the Supreme Court can invalidate
laws which violate the federal power to conduct foreign affairs despite the absence of
conflict with federal regulations or policies).
135. See Am. Ins. Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 423 (insinuating that the President’s authority
requires flexibility in economic diplomacy, and state laws infringing upon this field
compromise his ability); see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016) (stating
Israel is an important ally for the nation as a whole and New York shares a special bond
with it).
136. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62, 67 (1941) (articulating that generally
in the field of foreign affairs, federal power reigns supreme); see also tit. 9, § 8.157
(punishing those who boycott Israel and thus creating a preference for Israel as a matter
of foreign policy).
137. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67-68 (emphasizing that government power regarding
international relations has always been broad).
138. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 377 (2000) (arguing that a Massachusetts law imposing
economic sanctions on Burma lessens the President’s ability to impose economic and
diplomatic pressure on Burma).
139. See id. (reasoning that due to national security concerns, the President requires
the flexibility to respond to change in diplomatic relations by altering sanctions without
obstacles).
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President carries this authority to achieve political results, and the broad
scope of this authority shows how important it is for Congress to attain those
results.140 In important respects, Crosby is identical to New York’s EO No.
157 and the surrounding facts.141 Both situations involve state measures that
sought to restrict state agencies from doing business with companies
supporting a particular foreign nation.142 The statute mandated the creation
and maintenance of a list of such entities, and EO No. 157 also requires the
creation and maintenance of a list of entities that support BDS.143 Therefore,
both thus undermine the President’s authority to represent the United States
on foreign affairs matters.144 In these situations, field and foreign powers
preemption is clear.
The Supreme Court has ruled that when an issue involves foreign countries
communicating their concerns to the United States, it is essential that they
communicate with one national sovereign and not fifty separate states.145
New York’s EO No. 157 creates a disjointed communication between the
United States and the world because it establishes an inconsistency that
would repel potential trade partners that participate in BDS but not the Arab
League boycott of Israel.146 Under the current standard, such a business
would have to interact separately with the federal government and the New
York government because of EO No. 157’s contradicting stipulations.147
Although New York’s EO No. 157 does not discriminate on its face against

140. See id. (highlighting the importance of the President’s powers as well as
Congress’ need for them).
141. See id. at 366 (ruling unconstitutional a Massachusetts law which restricted its
agencies from conducting business with companies that supported Burma); see also tit.
9, § 8.157 (preventing its agencies from conducting business with companies that
participate in BDS).
142. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366 (advising that the Burma law limits state agencies
from working with entities doing business with Burma).
143. See id. at 367-68 (explaining that the statute widely defined “doing business with
Burma”, with three exceptions to the ban).
144. See id. at 374 (punishing companies that work with Burma, and stating that the
Massachusetts law diminishes the President’s capabilities as a diplomat); see also tit. 9,
§ 8.157 (prohibiting support of Palestinians by refusing to allow government agencies to
have contracts with businesses that support BDS,).
145. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (referring to a
country’s concerns over the status, safety, and security of its nationals and the country’s
wish to confer with the American government about those concerns).
146. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 376 (distinguishing the Massachusetts law because it
penalized things that the federal law allowed).
147. See id. at 364 (clarifying that the Massachusetts law punished persons and
actions that Congress has explicitly excluded from sanctions).
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foreign companies, it could hinder the “one voice” of the President by
requiring an entity to negotiate with the President and New York
Governor.148 State laws do not and cannot have the authority to dismantle
the unified voice that the President needs to present to the rest of the world.149
When a state involves itself with international economic boycott policies,
it effectively undermines the federal authority in adjusting its economic
pressures, and pursuing multilateral strategies with foreign countries.150 An
inconsistency between state and federal policies regarding BDS threatens the
power of the President to utilize economic incentives and sanctions to
achieve national goals.151 If the United States Government desires to punish
BDS participants or to even adopt certain tactics to pressure Israel into
altering its human rights policies, laws like New York’s EO No. 157 would
undermine their calibration of force.152
Courts have held that it is essential for the President to represent a unified
nation regarding foreign affairs policies.153 In Odebrecht, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit analyzed a state law similar to New York’s
EO No. 157.154 Both laws punished entities which practiced certain
economic policies.155 The Odebrecht court noted that the law punished those
who did business with Cuba; and in New York, the law punishes those who
refuse to purchase certain products benefiting Israel.156 The law conflicted

148. See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 67 (1st Cir. 1999)
(referencing Massachusetts’s Burma law which both discriminated against foreign
commerce and curtailed the federal government’s “one voice” in foreign affairs).
149. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381 (stating that such state laws compromise the ability
of the President to present one voice).
150. See id. at 382 (reminding that discrepancies between state and federal sanctions
complicate discussions between countries).
151. See id. at 381 (reasoning that the President’s maximum authority to influence
other countries rests on his access to the national economy without random exception).
152. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268,
1283 (11th Cir. 2013) (implying that by imposing its own sanctions, Massachusetts
lessened Congress’ calibration of force).
153. See id. at 1272 (holding that the federal government’s foreign affairs powers
preempted a Florida statute which prohibited the state from granting public contracts to
companies with business relations with Cuba).
154. See id. (explaining that Florida banned agencies from giving public contracts to
companies that worked with Cuba); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016)
(forbidding state agencies from investing in companies that support BDS).
155. See Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1272 (preventing companies that have relations with
Cuba from bidding on Florida public contracts); tit. 9, § 8.157 (prohibiting state funding
for companies which support BDS).
156. See Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1272 (including all subsidiaries, parent companies,

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss4/5

20

Hillou: Criminalizing Nonviolent Dissent

2017]

CRIMINALIZING NONVIOLENT DISSENT

547

with the federal scheme regarding economic pressure to Cuba by punishing
conduct that Congress had overtly excluded from sanctions.157 Here, the
anti-BDS laws clash with the federal scheme regarding economic pressure
and diplomacy; the national government loses its power to economically
pressure Israel and Palestine to adhere to certain policies when state laws like
New York’s exist.158
The President’s power to influence other nations relies upon on his ability
to negotiate access to the American economy without interference by
inconsistent state policies.159 The President’s ability to influence is part of
the executive’s overall interest to play a productive role in the Middle East
peace process, especially the relations between Israel and Palestine.160 The
Court argued in Crosby that state acts addressing sanctions have the capacity
to affect relations with foreign nations. 161 Such state measures also affected
the ability to create alliances through diplomatic actions, which would best
promote human rights and democracy with specific nations.162 Similarly,
state measures like New York’s EO No. 157 have the potential to upset
American relations with allies of Palestine, as well as to hinder the ability of
the Executive branch to pressure both Israel and Palestine to adhere to
international law and human rights norms as steps towards achieving
peace.163 Such measures could distract at the negotiation table where
conversations with the United States become not about how to achieve peace,

or affiliates); tit. 9, § 8.157 (lacking limits to the list).
157. See Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1283 (referencing the Trading with the Enemy Act
which penalized violating the federal sanctions against Cuba).
158. See id. at 1272 (arguing that the Cuba Amendment directly conflicted with the
“extensive and highly calibrated federal regime of sanctions against Cuba promulgated
by the legislative and executive branches over almost fifty years”).
159. See id. at 1284-85 (recalling Congress’ grant of considerable power to adjust
sanctions).
160. See id. (stating that exceptions which alter the President’s ability to exhibit one
voice behalf of the economy weaken the President’s ability to work with the nation at
issue frustrate hopes of reaching solutions).
161. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 384 (2000) (providing
the example of how the Massachusetts Burma Law has the potential to affect American
discussions with the European Union, where high-level discussions revolved around “not
on what to do about Burma, but on what to do about the Massachusetts Burma Law”).
162. See id. (explaining that the Massachusetts law was a distraction at high-level
government meetings).
163. See id. at 376 (pointing out that the Executive’s authority regarding foreign
affairs is not only to make political statements but to receive political results, and the
entirety of such power shows the importance of it so there cannot be congressional intent
to compromise it via deference to states).
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but what to do about anti-BDS measures in states such as New York and
others.164 Based upon the views of the Supreme Court in Crosby, courts must
scrutinize EO No. 157 by the same standard and strike it down.165
Congress and the Executive branch have shown through various pieces of
legislation that they intend to occupy the field of economic policies regarding
Israel and its neighbors.166 These actions are constitutionally legitimate
pursuant to Congress and the President’s enumerated foreign affairs
powers.167 The TFTEA, EAA, and Ribicoff Amendment, are all legitimate
because they pertain to international trade issues which is a power belonging
to Congress.168
The New York EO No. 157 is preempted under the foreign policy doctrine
because it would likely limit the President’s ability to lift or impose
economic policies.169 Although the New York EO No. 157 differs from
Crosby because it punishes American citizens for boycotting Israel rather
that imposing extra sanctions, Crosby squarely addresses what powers states
have to control domestic policies regarding international boycotts, and
plainly rules that states cannot control domestic policies about international
boycotts.170
164. See id. at 384 (informing that discussions became not about Burma but what to
do with state laws regarding it).
165. See id. at 388 (holding that the Massachusetts law conflicted with the President’s
power to limit sanctions).
166. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 § 909, 19 U.S.C.A. §
4452(a)(5) (2016) (reaffirming the United States-Israel trade relationship); see also The
Export Administration Act (EAA), Pub. L. No. 96-72 § 8(a) (1979) (requiring US
persons to report when they help a forbidden boycott); see also Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, Title X, Part VI § 999 (a)-(b) (1976) (requiring U.S.
businesses to report operations related to boycotting countries to the IRS).
167. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381 (2000) (reaffirming that the President has the
constitutional power to make treaties and appoint public officials).
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 (establishing the Commerce Clause, which allows
Congress to regulate commerce with foreign countries); see also 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452
(2016) (alluding repetitively that boycott, divestment, and sanctions of Israel will not be
tolerated in international trade); see also Pub. L. No. 96-72 93 Stat. 503, 521 (1979)
(discouraging US persons from supporting forbidden boycotts); Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100
Stat. 2085 (1976) (requiring U.S. taxpayers to report business or commercial activities
alongside or related to boycotting countries).
169. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 376 (arguing that the Massachusetts law inconsistently
imposes economic pressure against Burma).
170. Compare id. at 366 (stating that the issue at hand is the constitutionality of a
Massachusetts law restricting its agencies from purchasing goods from or conducting
business with the country of Burma), with N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157
(2016) (restricting New York agencies from conducting business with companies listed
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New York’s EO No. 157 attempts to give the state of New York the power
to control domestic policies regarding international boycotts.171 A state
measure addressing an issue as sensitive as foreign economic sanctions gives
the President less diplomatic leverage as a consequence.172 Like Crosby,
where Massachusetts forbade state agencies from purchasing from any
company or person identified on a list of those doing business with Burma,
New York’s EO No. 157 forbids state agencies from investing in entities
which support BDS.173 To allow the state government to punish those who
support BDS represses advocates of Palestinian human rights and poses an
incredible threat to the constitutional foreign affairs powers of the
President.174
State policies addressing international economic sanctions contradict the
federal scheme to control that field.175 The Court of Appeals in Odebrecht
utilized as evidence many pieces of legislation regarding economic sanctions
and humanitarian relief regarding Cuba as evidence of congressional intent
to control the field.176 It ruled that passing many pieces of relevant
legislation clearly indicated that there was congressional intent to
pervasively regulate the subject.177 Similarly to the set of laws mentioned in
Odebrecht that control American economic policies concerning Cuba, the
TFTEA, EAA, and Ribicoff Amendment all regulate economic policies
pertaining to Israel and the boycott of Israel and indicate that Congress
on the Commissioner’s list).
171. See Crosby, 530 U.S. 363, 380 (2000) (saying that the Massachusetts Burma law
conflicts with the President’s power to provide the world with a comprehensive strategy
regarding Burma); see also tit. 9, § 8.157 (setting out a policy which represses the right
to boycott Israeli products).
172. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 377 (comparing the President’s diplomatic powers to
bargaining chips).
173. See id. at 367 (informing that the law exempted certain entities that were in
Burma); see also tit. 9, § 8.157 (mandating that the Commissioner lists BDS-supporting
companies and institutions without exemption).
174. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373-74 (noting that the Massachusetts law which
attempted to control policy regarding international boycotts hindered the President’s
effective voice and his ability to facilitate dialogue between conflicting parties).
175. See id. at 380-81 (stating that the President has the authority to speak on behalf
of the nation regarding economic policies affecting the U.S.-Burman relations); see also
Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th
Cir. 2013) (ruling that a Florida law weakened the President’s ability to speak on
economic sanctions of Cuba).
176. See Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1275-77 (discussing in detail the history of
presidential and congressional regulations of American economic policies with Cuba).
177. See id. (insinuating that the federal government enacted a pervasive scheme
through many statutes, executive orders, and regulations).
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wishes to dominate the subject pervasively.178 Economic sanctions have the
power to persuade and pressure foreign nations to follow certain policies. 179
As such, policies that touch upon such sensitive international issues like
Cuba, Israel, and Palestine are regulated solely by the federal government.180
Punishing organizations and companies that are international in nature
(via the required public blacklist) also falls under the foreign relations
doctrine.181 In Odebrecht, Florida’s Cuba Amendment required companies
to prove that they did not do business with Cuba; if they falsified the
information, they were penalized.182 Foreign nations, such as Canada and
Brazil, as well as several member parties of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), complained about Florida’s Cuba Amendment and its
punishment.183 New York’s EO No. 157 is similar to Florida’s Cuba
Amendment in that it inflicts broader punishments than the federal scheme
does: no federal laws mandate a publicly available list of BDS supporters.184
178. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1976) (setting
policies deterring or punishing participation with an international boycott); see also The
Export Administration Act (EAA), Pub. L. No. 96-72 93 Stat. 503, 521 (1979)
(prohibiting the boycott of allied nations and establishing punishment for those who
participate in such boycotts); see also 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452 (addressing BDS in the
international context).
179. See Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1275 (stating that economic policies pertaining to
Cuba are complex).
180. See id. (insinuating that economic sanctions are so sensitive and impactful on
foreign relations that they must be regulated by the federal government).
181. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016) (requiring the
Commissioner to list any institutions and companies that partake in BDS); Odebrecht,
715 F.3d at 1279 (explaining that the broad preliminary list included 238 companies that
Florida invested in, such as “major airlines, banks, . . . and oil companies”); see also
“Institutions or Companies Determined to Participate in Boycott, Divestment, or
Sanctions Activity Targeting Israel,” Office of General Services (May 31, 2017),
https://www.ogs.state.ny.us/eo/157/Docs/EO157_Institutions_Companies_List.pdf
(listing international companies such as Betsah SA and FreedomCall UK).
182. See Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1279 (discussing Florida’s Cuba Amendment which
was enforced through a public bidding process that penalized companies that did
business in Cuba).
183. See id. at 1279-80 (informing that a WTO meeting took place as the European
Union sought information about the law; additional examples of concerned countries
include Norway, Singapore, and Switzerland).
184. Compare United States-Israel trade and commercial enhancement § 909, 19
U.S.C.A. § 4452 (2016)(d)(1) (requiring the President to annually submit a report to
Congress regarding politically motivated boycotts of, divestment from, and sanctions
against Israel), and The Export Administration Act (EAA), Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat.
503, 522 (1979) (requiring US persons to report requests to participate in prohibited
boycotts every quarter to the Commerce Department), and Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
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New York’s EO No. 157 evidently imposes greater punishments than any
federal law and, like in Odebrecht, is preempted.185
With the support of Congress, only the President may possess the power
to regulate the national response to the boycott of Israel as well as to
determine the extent of our economic and political relations with Israel.186
The President’s power to determine the nation’s economic policies and to
use them as diplomatic leverage is the peak of presidential political power.187
Congress would not go to various legislative lengths to empower the
President and address boycotts of Israel if it wished to compromise that
power by allowing states to inflict tougher punishments on such
boycotters.188
The seemingly small discrepancies between state regulations and the
existing federal laws regarding economic policies pertaining to boycotts of
or solidarity with Israel have the potential to create tremendous
reverberations.189
In Crosby, the Supreme Court noted that the
Massachusetts Burma Law, although somewhat consistent with subsequent
federal legislation, created a quagmire of negative responses from other
nations.190 The backlash went so far as to include a warning from European
Union officials that the law “could have a damaging effect on bilateral EUUS relations.”191 The Act not only ignited international trade dispute
L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1976) (requiring U.S. taxpayers and businesses to report
business or commercial activities alongside or related to boycotting countries to the IRS),
with N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016) (requiring the Commissioner
to list pro-BDS businesses and publish them on a website and to punish all entities that
participate in the BDS Movement).
185. See Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1281 (stating that the Cuba Amendment conflicted
with federal law in various ways, and had a wider scope of punishment than the federal
scheme, which permitted certain acts that Florida punished).
186. See id. at 1285 (pointing out that the President’s power over foreign relations is
his most substantial power, and he alone can speak for the nation).
187. See id. (claiming that the Cuba Amendment is at odds with federal law because
the President is at the zenith of his Congress-given power, which grants him the
discretion to direct national economic policies toward Cuba).
188. See id. at 1286 (pointing out that state legislation has the potential to hinder
presidential discretionary powers in relation to foreign affairs and create enclaves that
the President cannot access).
189. See id. (informing that Florida’s Cuba Amendment received international
protests); see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367-68 (2000)
(explaining that state economic laws like the Massachusetts Burma Law not only affect
the American relationship with Burma, but with other countries).
190. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 382 (noting that a number of allies and trading partners
formally filed protests with the federal government regarding the Act).
191. See id. at 383 (sharing that the European Union not only gave this warning but
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proceedings within the WTO, but unnecessarily complicated diplomatic
relations with other nations.192 Here, New York’s EO No. 157 has the
capability of igniting similar reactions.193 New York’s anti-BDS EO No.
157, like the Massachusetts Burma Law, has the potential to not only punish
companies or organizations that partake in BDS, but to damage US relations
with foreign nations.194 Like in Crosby, New York’s EO No. 157 could open
the United States to lawsuits in the WTO because it plausibly affects
international trade.195 Additionally, it would punish foreign allies that
conduct business with such companies or organizations, which would
damage diplomatic relations.196
4. Under a Federal Objectives Lens, EO No. 157 is Again
Unconstitutional Because It Impedes Federal Objectives
When a state law stands as an obstacle to a federal goal, or undermines the
purposes of an act, federal objectives preemption applies.197 The federal
government has indicated that its objective is to punish boycotts in
divestment from, and sanctions of Israel in a purely international context,
and New York’s EO No. 157 stands as an obstacle to its achievement of that
goal.198 The most recent example was President Barack Obama signing into
pursued proceedings beside Japan in the WTO).
192. See id. (arguing that the responses of foreign governments and the Executive
serve as evidence of the Act’s frustration of federal objectives).
193. See id. at 383-84 (referencing the Assistant Secretary of State Larson who said
that the Act hindered coalition-building with allies intended to pressure Burma to
promote human rights and democracy)
194. See id. at 383 (sharing that the European Union partook in proceedings beside
Japan in the WTO against the United States).
195. See id., 530 U.S. 363, 383 (noting that several foreign nations brought suit
against the US under the WTO Dispute Settlement Process because Florida’s law
restricted international trade).
196. See id. at 370 (identifying the respondent as National Foreign Trade Council, a
nonprofit corporation that represented companies involved with foreign commerce,
thirty-four of whom were named on Massachusetts’ restricted purchase list).
197. See id. at 373-74 (reasoning that the Massachusetts Burma law impeded the
objectives of federal law and undermined the intentions of Congress to give the President
flexible authority with economic policies).
198. Compare United States-Israel trade and commercial enhancement § 909, 19
U.S.C.A. § 4452(b)(7) (2016) (establishing the nation’s stance toward BDS actions at
international trade tables), and The Export Administration Act (EAA), Pub. L. No. 9672, 93 Stat. 503, 523 (1979) (requiring US persons to report requests to participate in
prohibited international boycotts), and Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100
Stat. 2085 (1976) (requiring U.S. taxpayers and businesses to report business or
commercial activities alongside or related to boycotting countries), with N.Y. COMP.

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss4/5

26

Hillou: Criminalizing Nonviolent Dissent

2017]

CRIMINALIZING NONVIOLENT DISSENT

553

law the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015.199 That Act
contained specific provisions addressing American-Israeli trade relations
and commercial enhancement policies.200 Congress intended to address this
subject even though the Act does not explicitly mention BDS, unlike the NY
measure.201 Consequently, the federal act preempts NY from passing this
ordinance.202 Thus, just as in Crosby, Congress has spoken on U.S. policy
with regard to boycotts in the region and the states may not regulate in this
area.203
Congress has furthered its objective to establish a careful standard
regarding international boycotts with not only one, but two federal laws
addressing international boycotts.204 These statutes are The Export
Administration Act of 1979205 and The Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax
Reform Act of 1976.206 These two laws regulate U.S. persons who comply
with a foreign nation’s policies to boycott another country.207 Both of these
federal statutes do not mention BDS as it did not exist in the 1970s, but the
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016) (requiring the Commissioner to list pro-BDS
businesses in New York and for agencies to divest from them).
199. See United States-Israel Trade and Commercial Enhancement § 909, 19
U.S.C.A. § 4452 (2016) (announcing the American government’s opposition to boycott,
divestment, and sanction tactics).
200. See id. (establishing its opposition to boycotts of Israel and requiring the
President submit a report to Congress on “politically motivated boycotts of, divestment
from, and sanctions against Israel”).
201. See id. (stating that “boycott of, divestment from, and sanctions against
Israel” will not be tolerated within the context of international trade).
202. See id. § 909(d) (affirming that the US-Israel alliance is strategically important,
and listing various ways through which the United States has and will combat forms of
boycott, divestment, and sanctions targeting Israel).
203. See id.; Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000)
(specifying that international economic policies fall under the foreign affairs doctrine).
204. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2011) (demonstrating that
Arizona’s law frustrated federal objectives because it would interfere with Congress’
careful balance).
205. See The Export Administration Act (EAA), Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, 504
§ 8(a) (1979) (establishing the federal government’s power to control restrictive trade
practices with other countries).
206. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 Title X, Part
VI § 999 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (1976) (requiring U.S. taxpayers and businesses to report
activities alongside boycotting countries to the IRS).
207. See Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, 504 § 8(a) (1979) (punishing those who
participate in forbidden boycotts at the request of other nations); Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100
Stat. 2085 Title X, Part VI § 999 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (1976) (mandating U.S. taxpayers and
businesses to report activities to the IRS).
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statutes apply to the Arab League boycott of Israel.208 Thus, the federal
government has acted to control the boycott policies regarding Israel, in
addition to the extent of record-keeping of those who do boycott it.209 New
York may not act in this same sphere.210
Conflicts between the objectives of state and federal laws regarding
punishments for certain activity further emphasizes the existence of federal
objectives preemption, especially where there is a possibility of impediment
of national policies.211 As highlighted in Crosby, conflict in technique,
despite symmetry in goals, has the potential to be as disruptive to the federal
scheme as an actual conflict in policy.212 In applying this to New York’s EO
No. 157, the government has already established its goals regarding BDS: to
address it solely in an international context.213
Even if an entity is able to comply with the federal and state regulations,
the ends do not justify the conflicting means.214 As a result, a company or
organization that previously complied with the aforementioned federal laws
pertaining to boycotts of Israel and BDS would face inconsistent
regulations.215 As such, New York EO No. 157 conflicts with the federal
power to impose whatever degree of punishment it deems necessary upon

208. See MELISSA REDMILES, INTERNATIONAL BOYCOTT REPORTS, 2003 AND 2004 at
168 (2004), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03-04boycott.pdf (informing that Congress
responded to the Arab League boycott of Israel by passing legislation to discourage
domestic support).
209. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2011) (ruling that a section
of the law actually impeded federal objectives because it involved a conflict in the
enforcement method).
210. See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)
(insinuating that acceptable state regulation would be a domestic issue).
211. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503 (reinforcing that the conflicts between the
Arizona law and the federal scheme indicated that federal objectives preemption existed).
212. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379 (2000) (arguing
that a common end does not justify conflicting means).
213. See United States-Israel trade and commercial enhancement § 909, 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 4452(b) (2016) (alluding repetitively that boycott, divestment, and sanctions of Israel
will not be tolerated in international trade); The Export Administration Act (EAA), Pub.
L. No. 96-72 (1979) (establishing the federal government’s power to control restrictive
trade practices with other countries); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100
Stat. 2085 (1976) (requiring U.S. taxpayers and businesses to report business or
commercial activities alongside or related to boycotting countries to the IRS).
214. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379-80 (2000)
(arguing that although Massachusetts had the same intentions as the federal government,
conflict will occur when two separate schemes are implemented upon the same activity).
215. See id. (noting the confusion of the inconsistent regulations).
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those who participate in BDS or boycotts of Israeli products.216
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
BDS is gaining traction, and reactionary measures have appeared not only
in the United States, but across the world.217 As a matter of policy, it is
important for the national government to present a unified, clear, and
unbiased voice when addressing BDS and its goal to pressure Israel into
compliance with international standards for human rights.218 States have no
place in punishing human rights activism by presenting varied measures,
which are clearly preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution.219 Anti-BDS measures are inherently flawed in multiple
aspects, and should not be in effect.220
Measures such as New York’s EO No. 157 establish, above anything else,
bad policy.221 For example, the previously discussed Trade Facilitation and
Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) essentially legitimizes Israeli
settlements, which is contrary to the history of U.S. policy, as well as
international policies.222 Despite the fact that international law states that
216. See id. at 380 (insinuating that separate remedies for the same activity and the
degree of pressure Congress wishes to employ on other nations are interlinked).
217. See Ron Kampeas, Anti-BDS Bill Would Make It Crime To Boycott West Bank
Settlements, FORWARD (Nov. 16, 2016), http://forward.com/news/breakingnews/354592/anti-bds-bill-would-make-it-crime-to-boycott-west-bank-settlements/
(explaining that the TFTEA was sparked as a response to a United Nations Human Rights
Council database listing companies that do business with Israeli settlements).
218. See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 67 (1st Cir. 1999)
(referencing Massachusetts’s Burma law, which both discriminated against foreign
commerce, and curtailed the federal government’s “one voice” in foreign affairs).
219. See supra Part III (arguing that under different types of preemption, federal law
invalidates New York’s EO No. 157).
220. See What to know about anti-BDS legislation, PALESTINE LEGAL (Aug. 16,
2016), http://palestinelegal.org/news/2016/6/3/what-to-know-about-anti-bds-legislation
(pointing out anti-BDS laws affect institutions like the Presbyterian church, which could
lose funding for social programs).
221. See id. (informing that the lists of BDS supporters are McCarthyite in nature and
unclear in implementation in its discussion of N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §
8.157 (2016)).
222. Compare 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452(f)(1) (extending its protections to territories
controlled by Israel, which translates to Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Golan
Heights), with S.C. Res. 446, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979) (criticizing Israeli
settlements as unlawful obstacles to a just and lasting peace in the region), and Press
Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Statement by the Press Sec’y on the
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enf’t Act of 2015 (Feb. 11, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/11/statement-press-
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settlements are illegal, the trade act’s verbiage implicitly attacks European
measures which restrict business with Israeli settlements.223 Unreasonable
stipulations such as these create a one-sided diplomatic approach, which
even the President himself has expressed dissatisfaction with.224 U.S.
persons must be allowed to engage in BDS without hindrance; the State
Department itself has recognized the right to boycott Israel as protected
under the right to free speech.225 Consequently, state politicians must veto
pending and future proposed anti-BDS measures.
The BDS campaign is similar to the boycott against South African
apartheid in the 1990s.226 Comparable to the latter’s protest of unequal
treatment and discriminatory laws, BDS expresses a discontent with the
Israeli treatment toward the Palestinian people.227 Despite the United States’
history of politically motivated boycotts, present-day politicians repeatedly
target and attempt to silence BDS.228 This is not the first time that Americans
have participated in politically-motivated boycotts, and it will not be the
last.229 To create and publish a list of people based only upon their political
views, and punish them for having such views, is simply McCarthyite in
secretary-trade-facilitation-and-trade-enforcement-act (refusing to support the language
in the TFTEA that legitimizes Israeli settlements).
223. See generally COMMISSION INTERPRETATIVE NOTICE ON INDICATION OF ORIGIN
OF GOODS FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE JUNE 1967, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
1-4
(2015),
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20151111_
interpretative_notice_indication_of_origin_en.pdf (informing that in conformity with
international law, the EU refuses to recognize Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian
territories since 1967, and that labels must reflect that goods from settlements are not
made in Israel but made in those illegal settlements).
224. See How does the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Affect BDS?, PALESTINE
LEGAL (July 9, 2016), http://palestinelegal.org/news/2015/7/1/how-does-the-tradepromotion-authority-tpa-law-affect-bds (referencing a State Department statement that
said the U.S. government does not support settlements and never has).
225. See Mark C. Toner, Daily Press Briefing, Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of
Press
Relations,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
State
(Nov.
7,
2016),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/11/264175.htm#MIDDLEEASTPEACE
(transcribing the Spokesman’s statement that although the government disagrees with
BDS, it also believes in protecting a citizen’s right to freedom of expression).
226. See What is BDS?, supra note 4 (declaring the campaign’s inspiration to be the
South Africa anti-apartheid campaign).
227. See id. (quoting Archbishop Desmond Tutu who compared the two movements).
228. See New York State wants to blacklist you, PALESTINE LEGAL (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://palestinelegal.org/news/2016/1/26/new-york-state-wants-to-blacklist-you (noting
that at least twenty-two anti-BDS bills were introduced in 2015).
229. See id. (referencing the Montgomery bus boycott, the California grape boycott,
and the South African anti-apartheid movement).

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss4/5

30

Hillou: Criminalizing Nonviolent Dissent

2017]

CRIMINALIZING NONVIOLENT DISSENT

557

nature.230
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have yet to review the legitimacy of anti-BDS legislation. If that
day comes, analysis under the Supremacy Clause would indicate that such
repression is unconstitutional.231 The Supremacy Clause allows federal law
to preempt EO No. 157 punishing BDS activists.232 Courts will quickly
realize that three implied preemption lenses arise when analyzing New
York’s EO No. 157 and similar measures: federal objectives, field, and
foreign affairs.233 As such, New York’s EO No. 157 and similar state
measures should be revoked.

230. See id. (reminding that the McCarthy era punished certain political views by
blacklisting individuals with those views).
231. See supra Part III (arguing that federal law, under implied preemption lenses,
preempts New York’s EO No. 157).
232. See supra Part III (analyzing the federal scheme which preempts New York’s
EO No. 157).
233. See supra Part II (explaining the applicable types of preemption).
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